Nepal-India Relations: The Vital Signs

On April 21st, in Nepal, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli finds himself at an impasse. Initially, his steadfast opposition during the 2015–2016 Indian trade embargo significantly bolstered his standing among voters, allowing him to ascend to the position of prime minister thrice. Following this period, his rhetoric against India resonated well within the country, leading him to aggressively criticize what he referred to as the "big brother." This culminated in mocking the Indian coat of arms, asserting that Lord Rama’s birthplace was located in Nepal, and overseeing the inclusion of the entire Kalapani area into Nepal's official maps before incorporating them into the nation's constitution. Leveraging patriotic sentiments proved advantageous initially; however, Oli eventually reached a more pragmatic understanding: While anti-Indian feelings have their place, they could turn counterproductive should one aim to govern effectively through federal structures. It dawned upon him that India holds substantial power—it might exploit tensions between parties like the Nepali Congress inside governing coalitions, instigate royalist demonstrations, or foster doubts about engaging constructively with someone perceived unfavorably such as himself, thereby undermining his political stability.

Oli’s leadership is met with disapproval—a sentiment largely unrelated to matters concerning India. However, seeking flexibility in governance, Oli hasn’t hesitated to provoke India once more, such as alleging that contemporary pro-monarchist demonstrations receive support from New Delhi. Despite this, his eagerness to gain New Delhi’s confidence remains clear. Failing to elicit a favorable reaction from India, Oli attempted to court China instead. Towards the end of last year, he traveled to Beijing where agreements were signed underpinning their Belt and Road Initiative collaboration. Through considerable efforts, he managed to engage in a roughly forty-minute tête-à-tête with his Indian peer, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during the margins of the recent Bimstec conference held in Thailand. Unfortunately, the discussion didn’t proceed smoothly; Modi advised Oli that improving relations would require him to curb inflammatory rhetoric and cease leveraging China against India. Meanwhile, New Delhi maintains cautious separation from its primary rival and conducts routine bilateral activities through Nepali Congress—the largest faction within Nepal’s governing alliance. Consequently, despite his endeavors, Oli has yet to secure an invite for a state visit to New Delhi; India appears unwilling to bestow further global recognition upon the Oli administration.

Each party should reconsider their strategies. Should Oli desire improved relations with New Delhi, he ought to cease making impolitic statements about India openly. Any messages needing conveyance can go through official diplomatic routes instead. Additionally, he has to be prepared to hear and respond to India’s valid worries. Conversely, New Delhi might benefit from adopting a less interventionist stance; appearing to orchestrate governmental changes in Kathmandu merely brings unwanted notoriety. The bond between Nepal and India is robust and multifaceted, thus no single administration in Kathmandu alone can sever these connections. Similarly, Delhi’s fixation on limiting China’s influence within Nepal may be exaggerated. Indian ties and sway over Nepal remain unparalleled. Ultimately, if the Nepalese populace perceives an effort to isolate their leader, this tactic risks provoking dormant anti-Indian sentiments which could prove counterproductive. Our wish is for both Kathmandu and New Delhi to move past parochial thinking and foster relationships aligned with mutual long-term benefits.